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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 Mumia Abu-Jamal was convicted of first-degree 
murder in state court and sentenced to death.  After 
exhausting state appeals, he filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  A divided panel of 
this court affirmed the denial of Abu-Jamal’s petition insofar 
as it challenged his conviction.  See Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 
F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008).  Our court denied his petition for 
rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States denied his petition for a writ of certiorari seeking 
review of his conviction, Abu-Jamal v. Beard, --- U.S. ----, 
129 S. Ct. 1910 (2009) (mem.).  Abu-Jamal’s conviction for 
first-degree murder stands. 
 On his death penalty challenge,1 the District Court 
found the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order denying post-
conviction relief involved an unreasonable application of 
United States Supreme Court precedent.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1).  We affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas 
relief on the sentence, see Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 304, and 
our court denied the petition for rehearing en banc.  The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania then petitioned the United 
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, challenging our 
affirmance of the District Court’s grant of habeas relief on the 
sentence.   
                                                 
1 Abu-Jamal claimed the jury was unconstitutionally limited 
in its consideration of mitigating factors to only mitigating 
factors found unanimously by the jury.  See Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
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 On January 19, 2010, the United States Supreme Court 
granted the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 
vacated our judgment as to Abu-Jamal’s sentence, and 
remanded for further consideration.  Beard v. Abu-Jamal, --- 
U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 1134 (2010) (mem.).  The Supreme Court 
directed that we reconsider our holding in light of intervening 
authority, Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 676 
(2010).   
After further review, we conclude the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court unreasonably applied Mills v. Maryland, 486 
U.S. 367 (1988), requiring Abu-Jamal’s death sentence to be 
vacated.  Our decision is required by Mills and consistent 
with Spisak.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of habeas relief on Abu-Jamal’s mitigation instruction 
claim.  
I. 
 In 1982, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Abu-Jamal of 
the murder of Philadelphia Police Officer Daniel Faulkner.  
See Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 274-76 (providing a full factual 
history).  The jury returned, and the judge imposed, a 
sentence of death.   
 The Pennsylvania courts denied Abu-Jamal’s claims 
on direct appeal and collateral review.  Commonwealth v. 
Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d 846 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Abu-
Jamal, 569 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990) (per curiam); Commonwealth 
v. Abu-Jamal, No. 1357, 1995 WL 1315980, at *128 (C.P. Ct. 
Phila. Cty. Sept. 15, 1995); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 
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720 A.2d 79 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 
A.2d 719 (Pa. 2003).  The United States Supreme Court 
denied Abu-Jamal’s petition for a writ of certiorari on 
October 1, 1990, Abu-Jamal v. Pennsylvania, 498 U.S. 881 
(1990) (mem.) (on direct review), his petition for rehearing on 
November 26, 1990, Abu-Jamal v. Pennsylvania, 498 U.S. 
993 (1990) (mem.), a second request for rehearing on June 
10, 1991, Abu-Jamal v. Pennsylvania, 501 U.S. 1214 (1991) 
(mem.), and a second and third petition for a writ of certiorari 
on October 4, 1999, Abu-Jamal v. Pennsylvania, 528 U.S. 
810 (1999) (mem.) (on collateral review), and May 17, 2004, 
Abu-Jamal v. Pennsylvania, 541 U.S. 1048 (2004) (mem.) 
(same), respectively. 
 Having exhausted state court remedies, Abu-Jamal 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  He challenged the validity of his 
criminal conviction, his capital sentence, and the sufficiency 
of post-conviction review.  He argued, among other things, 
that the sentencing phase of his trial violated the United 
States Constitution because the jury instructions and verdict 
sheet required jury unanimity in its findings with respect to 
the existence of mitigating circumstances.  The District Court 
denied the petition as to the conviction and post-conviction 
proceedings but accepted Abu-Jamal’s mitigation instruction 
claim.  See Abu-Jamal v. Horn, No. Civ. A. 99-5089, 2001 
WL 1609690, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2001).  The court 
concluded the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably 
applied United States Supreme Court precedent in finding 
otherwise and affirming the Court of Common Pleas of 
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Philadelphia County’s denial of post-conviction relief.  See 
id. at *126.  Consequently, the District Court granted a writ of 
habeas corpus on this claim and ordered the Commonwealth 
to conduct a new sentencing hearing or sentence Abu-Jamal 
to life imprisonment.  Id. at *130.  The Commonwealth 
appealed the order of the District Court granting the writ as to 
the sentencing and Abu-Jamal cross-appealed the denial of 
the writ with respect to the conviction.  As noted, we affirmed 
the judgment of the District Court in its entirety.  Abu-Jamal, 
520 F.3d at 274.2  Abu-Jamal subsequently filed a petition for 
panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, which was denied. 
 Thereafter, the parties filed cross-petitions for writs of 
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.  The 
Supreme Court denied Abu-Jamal’s petition seeking review 
of his conviction, see Abu-Jamal v. Beard, --- U.S. ----, 129 
S. Ct. 1910 (2009) (mem.), but granted the Commonwealth’s 
petition, vacated the portion of our judgment regarding Abu-
Jamal’s sentence, and remanded for further consideration in 
light of new authority, see Beard v. Abu-Jamal, --- U.S. ----, 
130 S. Ct. 1134 (2010) (mem.).   
 Our review on remand is limited to whether the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied United 
States Supreme Court precedent in finding no constitutional 
defect in the jury instructions and verdict form employed in 
                                                 
2 As noted, a divided panel affirmed the denial of habeas 
relief on the conviction; the entire panel affirmed the grant of 
habeas relief on the sentence.  See Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 
305 (Ambro, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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the sentencing phase of Abu-Jamal’s trial.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).  
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order, we consider this 
question in light of Spisak and will examine whether the 
verdict form and jury instructions in the present case are 
distinguishable from those at issue in Spisak such that, taken 
together, they clearly brought about a “substantial 
probability” the jury believed it was precluded from 
considering any mitigating circumstance not found 
unanimously.  Mills, 486 U.S. at 384. 
II. 
 Under the standard for habeas relief established by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas 
corpus will be denied unless the adjudication of a claim in 
state court proceedings “(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).   
 Under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), “a state-court 
decision is contrary to [Supreme Court] precedent if the state 
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by th[e] 
Court on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts 
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant 
Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to 
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[the Court’s].”  Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.  Here, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly identified Mills as the 
applicable Supreme Court precedent, and the facts at issue are 
not “materially indistinguishable” from those in Mills.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision was consequently not 
“contrary to” Mills.  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.   
 Accordingly, we consider only the second clause of § 
2254(d)(1), and must determine whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s decision to deny Abu-Jamal’s mitigation 
instruction claim “involved an unreasonable application of[] 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 
in Mills.  “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ 
clause . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ 
simply because that court concludes in its independent 
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.  Rather, 
that application must also be unreasonable.”  Williams, 529 
U.S. at 411; see Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 
(2007) (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal 
court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect 
but whether that determination was unreasonable—a 
substantially higher threshold.”).  The Supreme Court has 
instructed that, in making this inquiry, we “should ask 
whether the state court’s application of clearly established 
federal law was objectively unreasonable.”  Williams, 529 
U.S. at 409. 
 In Spisak, the Supreme Court found no violation of 
Mills and consequently concluded the state court decision at 
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issue, reaching the same conclusion, was not “‘contrary to, or 
. . . an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ in Mills.”  130 S. Ct. at 684 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1)) (alteration in original).  Accordingly, consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s order to reconsider in light of 
Spisak, we first evaluate whether a Mills violation has 
occurred, and then proceed to examine whether the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of Mills was 
objectively unreasonable under the second clause of § 
2254(d)(1).   
III. 
 In Mills, the Supreme Court vacated a death sentence 
after finding there was “a substantial probability that 
reasonable jurors, upon receiving the judge’s instructions in 
this case, and in attempting to complete the verdict form as 
instructed, well may have thought they were precluded from 
considering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors 
agreed on the existence of a particular such circumstance.”3  
486 U.S. at 384.  The Court held the Constitution proscribes 
imposition of the death penalty if members of the jury could 
reasonably believe they are precluded from considering 
                                                 
3 Spisak used the word “possibility” instead of “probability” 
when quoting directly from Mills.  See 130 S. Ct. at 684 
(quoting Mills, 486 U.S. at 384).  We take this to have been 
inadvertent, and in any event Mills used both formulations.  
See 486 U.S. at 377, 384.  We do not understand Spisak to 
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mitigating evidence unless the jury unanimously agrees the 
mitigating circumstance has been proven to exist.  Id. at 380, 
384; see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442-43 
(1990) (“Mills requires that each juror be permitted to 
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence when deciding 
the ultimate question whether to vote for a sentence of 
death.”).4 
 The verdict form at issue in Mills included a list of 
potentially mitigating circumstances, and spaces for the jury 
to check “yes” or “no” after each circumstance.  Preceding 
the list, the form read “‘[b]ased upon the evidence we 
unanimously find that each of the following mitigating 
circumstances which is marked ‘yes’ has been proven to exist 
                                                                                                             
have changed the legal standard for evaluating this kind of 
question. 
4 In Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), the Supreme 
Court held “[t]he legal standard for reviewing jury 
instructions claimed to restrict impermissibly a jury’s 
consideration of relevant evidence,” id. at 378, is “whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 
challenged instruction in a way that prevents the 
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence,” id. at 
380.  Because Spisak relied exclusively on Mills’ “substantial 
probability” standard, and because we think a “substantial 
probability” is neither more nor less than a “reasonable 
likelihood,” see Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 300 & n.13 
(3d Cir. 2004), we will consider whether there is a 
“substantial probability” the jury believed it was precluded 
from finding a mitigating circumstance that had not been 
unanimously agreed upon. 
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. . . and each mitigating circumstance marked ‘no’ has not 
been proven . . . .’”  Mills, 486 U.S. at 387 (Appendix to the 
Opinion of the Court).  Next, the form read “‘[b]ased on the 
evidence we unanimously find that it has been proven . . . that 
the mitigating circumstances marked ‘yes’ . . . outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances,’” and provided spaces where the 
jury could mark either “yes” or “no.”  Id. at 388-89.  Thus, 
the “instructions, together with the forms, told the jury to 
mark ‘yes’ on [the] list of mitigating factors only if the jury 
unanimously concluded that the particular mitigating factor 
had been proved, and to consider in its weighing analysis . . . 
only those mitigating factors marked ‘yes.’”  Spisak, 130 S. 
Ct. at 683.  Accordingly, the Court found the jury was “not 
free . . . to consider all relevant evidence in mitigation as they 
balanced aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” but only 
mitigating evidence found unanimously to exist.5  Mills, 486 
U.S. at 380.  The Mills Court conceded that a constitutional 
“construction of the jury instructions and verdict form is 
plausible,” id. at 377, but remanded for resentencing because 
there was “at least a substantial risk that the jury was 
misinformed,” id. at 381, and had reasonably interpreted the 
jury instructions and verdict form to preclude consideration of 
mitigating circumstances not found unanimously, see id. at 
384 (“Under our cases, the sentencer must be permitted to 
consider all mitigating evidence.  The possibility that a single 
juror could block such consideration, and consequently 
                                                 
5 The jury in Mills did not mark “yes” next to any mitigating 
circumstance, 486 U.S. at 387-88, and did not actually reach 
the balancing stage, id. at 380 n.13. 
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require the jury to impose the death penalty, is one we dare 
not risk.”). 
 We conclude the verdict form and jury instructions in 
this case likewise created a substantial probability the jury 
believed it was precluded from finding a mitigating 
circumstance that had not been unanimously agreed upon.  In 
relevant part, the first page of the verdict form used in Abu-
Jamal’s trial stated:  
(1) We, the jury, unanimously sentence the 
 defendant to  
 [X] death 
 [   ] life imprisonment. 
(2) (To be used only if the aforesaid 
 sentence is death) 
 We, the jury, have found unanimously    
 [   ] at least one aggravating 
 circumstance and no mitigating 
 circumstance.  The aggravating 
 circumstance(s) is/are  
________________________________. 
[X] one or more aggravating 
circumstances which outweigh any 
mitigating circumstances.  The 
aggravating circumstance(s) is/are 
 _______________A_______________. 
The mitigating circumstance(s) is/are 
_______________A________________. 
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The second page listed ten potentially aggravating 
circumstances (a-j).  A third page listed eight potentially 
mitigating circumstances (a-h).6  Each of the potential 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance listed had a space 
next to it for the jury to place a checkmark if it found the 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance to exist.  On the third 
and final page, there were twelve spaces for each juror to sign 
his or her name, and each did.  The instructions given to the 
jury provided, in part: 
Members of the jury, you must now decide 
whether the defendant is to be sentenced to 
death or life imprisonment.  The sentence will 
depend upon your findings concerning 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The 
Crimes Code provides that a verdict must be a 
sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds 
at least one aggravating circumstance and no 
mitigating circumstance, or if the jury 
unanimously finds one or more aggravating 
circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
circumstances. 
                                                 
6 The jury placed a checkmark next to mitigating 
circumstance (a) on the third page and then indicated this 
selection on the first page by writing “A.”  Circumstance (a) 
reads: “The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal convictions[.]”  Circumstance (h) allowed the jury to 
consider and select “[a]ny other mitigating matter concerning 
the character or record of the defendant or the circumstances 
of his offense.” 
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The verdict must be a sentence of life 
imprisonment in all other cases. 
 
. . . . . 
 
The [C]ommonwealth has the burden of proving 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The defendant has the burden of proving 
mitigating circumstances, but only by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  This is a lesser 
burden of proof than beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  A preponderance of the evidence exists 
where one side is more believable than the other 
side. . . . 
 
Now, the verdict is for you, members of the 
jury.  Remember and consider all of the 
evidence giving it the weight to which it is 
entitled. Remember that you are not merely 
recommending a punishment.  The verdict you 
return will actually fix the punishment at death 
or life imprisonment.  Remember again that 
your verdict must be unanimous.  It cannot be 
reached by a majority vote or by any 
percentage. It must be the verdict of each and 
everyone [sic] of you. 
 
Remember that your verdict must be a sentence 
of death if you unanimously find at least one 
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aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
circumstances.  Or, if you unanimously find one 
or more aggravating circumstances which 
outweigh any mitigating circumstances.  In all 
other cases, your verdict must be a sentence of 
life imprisonment. 
 
 It is substantially probable the verdict form’s first 
page, especially “[w]e, the jury, have found unanimously . . . 
one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any 
mitigating circumstances,” was read by the jury to mean that 
both aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be found 
unanimously.  The jury instructions read similarly, stating:  
“The Crimes Code provides that a verdict must be a sentence 
of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating 
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, or if the jury 
unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances 
which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.”  And the 
portion of the form where the jury was instructed to identify 
any mitigating circumstances found—“The mitigating 
circumstance(s) is/are ___.”—was introduced by the words 
“[w]e, the jury, have found unanimously.”  Moreover, the 
instructions throughout and repeatedly emphasized 
unanimity.  In light of the language and parallel structure of 
the form and instructions in relation to aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, it is notable that neither the verdict 
form nor the judge’s charge said or in any way suggested that 
the jury should apply the unanimity requirement to its 
findings of aggravating but not mitigating circumstances.  
This absence is also notable because the trial court 
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distinguished between the two with respect to the proper 
burden of proof the jury should apply.   
 We conclude the verdict form together with the jury 
instructions read that unanimity was required in the 
consideration of mitigating circumstances and that there is a 
substantial probability the jurors believed they were 
precluded from independent consideration of mitigating 
circumstances in violation of Mills.  We now compare the 
instructions at issue in Spisak with the verdict form and jury 
charge here to determine whether our conclusion is consistent 
with Spisak. 
IV. 
 In Spisak the Supreme Court evaluated a Sixth Circuit 
decision holding a habeas petitioner’s sentencing instructions 
unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court found the forms and 
instructions used in the sentencing phase of Spisak’s trial 
“differ[ed] significantly,” Spisak, 130 S. Ct. at 683, from 
those at issue in Mills such that Mills was not violated and 
“consequently . . . the state court[] decision upholding the[] 
forms and instructions was not ‘contrary to, or . . . an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ in 
Mills,”  id. at 684 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1)).  In Spisak’s trial, the jury found aggravating 
circumstances prior to, and separately from, the sentencing 
phase of the trial when the jury was directed to consider 
mitigating circumstances.  At Spisak’s sentencing hearing, the 
trial judge instructed the jury that the “aggravating factors 
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they would consider were the specifications that the jury had 
found proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase of 
the trial—essentially, that each murder was committed in a 
course of conduct including . . . other crimes, and, for two of 
the murders, that the murder was committed with the intent to 
evade apprehension or punishment for another offense.”  Id. 
at 683.  The judge then explained what a mitigating factor 
was, listed examples, and informed the jury they should 
consider “any other” mitigating circumstances “relevant to 
the issue of whether the defendant should be sentenced to 
death.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The judge 
then instructed the jury on how it should reach its verdict: 
[Y]ou, the trial jury, must consider all of the 
relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence 
and testimony received in this hearing and the 
arguments of counsel.  From this you must 
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the aggravating circumstances, which [Spisak] 
has been found guilty of committing in the 
separate counts are sufficient to outweigh the 
mitigating factors present in this case. 
If all twelve members of the jury find by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstance in each separate count outweighs 
the mitigating factors, then you must return that 
finding to the Court. 
. . . . . 
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On the other hand, if after considering all of the 
relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence 
and the testimony received at this hearing and 
the arguments of counsel, you find that the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating circumstances which [Spisak] 
has been found guilty of committing in the 
separate counts outweigh the mitigating factors, 
you will then proceed to determine which of 
two possible life imprisonment sentences to 
recommend to the Court. 
Id. at 683-84 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Two sets of verdict forms were made available to 
the jury.  One read: 
We the jury in this case . . . do find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstance which the defendant . . . was 
found guilty of committing was sufficient to 
outweigh the mitigating factors present in this 
case. 
We the jury recommend that the sentence of 
death be imposed . . . . 
Spisak Trial Transcript of July 19, 1983, at 2975-76, Court of 
Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  The other read: 
We the jury . . . do find that the aggravating 
circumstances which the defendant . . . was 
found guilty of committing are not sufficient to 
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outweigh the mitigating factors present in this 
case. 
We the jury recommend that the defendant . . . 
be sentenced to life imprisonment . . . . 
Id. at 2976.   
 After reviewing the jury instructions and the language 
of the verdict forms, the Supreme Court found that: 
The instructions and forms made clear that, to 
recommend a death sentence, the jury had to 
find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that each of the aggravating factors 
outweighed any mitigating circumstances.  But 
the instructions did not say that the jury must 
determine the existence of each individual 
mitigating factor unanimously.  Neither the 
instructions nor the forms said anything about 
how—or even whether—the jury should make 
individual determinations that each particular 
mitigating circumstance existed.  They focused 
only on the overall balancing question.  And the 
instructions repeatedly told the jury to 
“conside[r] all of the relevant evidence.” 
Spisak, 130 S. Ct. at 684 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted).  Based on these findings, the Court concluded: 
In our view the instructions and verdict forms 
did not clearly bring about, either through what 
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they said or what they implied, the circumstance 
that Mills found critical, namely, “a substantial 
possibility [sic] that reasonable jurors, upon 
receiving the judge’s instructions in this case, 
and in attempting to complete the verdict form 
as instructed, well may have thought they were 
precluded from considering any mitigating 
evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the 
existence of a particular such circumstance.” 
Id. at 684 (quoting Mills, 486 U.S. at 384).   
 The Commonwealth claims the instructions examined 
in Spisak are “virtually identical” to the language at issue 
here, which must therefore also be read to address only the 
final balancing question.  The Commonwealth sees 
equivalence in “‘[i]f all twelve members of the jury find by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstance in each separate count outweighs the mitigating 
factors,’” Spisak, 130 S. Ct. at 683, and “[w]e, the jury, have 
found unanimously . . . one or more aggravating 
circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
circumstances,” from Abu-Jamal’s verdict form.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth contends the verdict form’s first page does 
not read that both aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
must be found unanimously in violation of Mills. 
 We disagree.  The identified language of unanimity at 
issue in Spisak addressed only how the jury should weigh 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, not how to find 
either individual aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  
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Spisak, 130 S. Ct. at 684.  The forms and instructions in 
Spisak contained no language whatsoever “about how—or 
even whether—the jury should make individual 
determinations that each particular mitigating circumstance 
existed.”  Id. at 684. 
 The verdict form and judge’s instructions used in the 
sentencing phase of Abu-Jamal’s trial are materially different 
and easily distinguished from those at issue in Spisak.  By 
contrast with Spisak, the identified language of unanimity 
here indisputably addresses more than the final balancing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors. “We, the jury, have found 
unanimously,” directly refers to “one or more aggravating 
circumstances,” and in the absence of any instruction or even 
suggestion to the contrary, it is substantially probable the jury 
applied the unanimity requirement to “mitigating 
circumstances” as well.  When “read naturally,” Spisak, 130 
S. Ct. at 682, in the context of the form and instructions, there 
is a substantial probability the word “unanimously” was 
understood by the jury to modify and refer to the finding of 
both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.7 
 Moreover, by further contrast with Spisak, the form 
and instructions required the jury to make individual 
determinations that certain identified mitigating 
                                                 
7 The same language appears again in the jury instructions:  
“The Crimes Code provides that a verdict must be a sentence 
of death . . . if the jury unanimously finds one or more 
aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
circumstances.” 
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circumstances existed and “said or . . . implied,” id., at 684, 
that these determinations must be made unanimously.  The 
verdict form at issue in this case required the jury to select 
any mitigating circumstances found from a list of potentially 
mitigating circumstances; as discussed, the list is 
accompanied by spaces for a checkmark after each potential 
circumstance.  The trial judge instructed the jury to identify 
each mitigating circumstance it found and considered in its 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances:   
[The] mitigating circumstances appear on the 
third page here.  They run from a little (a) to a 
little letter (h).  And whichever ones you find 
there, you will put an “X” mark or check mark 
and then, put it on the front here at the bottom 
[of the first page], which says mitigating 
circumstances. 
In Spisak the jury had already determined the existence of 
aggravating circumstances at the guilt phase, separately from 
and before the sentencing phase of the trial.  Here, the form 
and instructions required the jury to make individual 
determinations regarding both mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances contemporaneously during the penalty phase.  
The verdict form introduced the list of potential mitigating 
circumstances with the list of aggravating circumstances 
under one heading reading “AGGRAVATING AND 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.”  The jury was 
instructed identically as to each list.8  The parallel structure of 
                                                 
8 The jury instructions for aggravating circumstances stated:   
22 
 
the form in relation to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances reads that findings as to each should be made 
similarly.  See Mills, 486 U.S. at 378 (“[W]e presume that, 
unless instructed to the contrary, the jury would read similar 
language throughout the form consistently.”).  Additionally, 
                                                                                                             
 
And what you do, you go to Page 2.  Page 2 
lists all the aggravating circumstances.  They go 
from small letter (a) to small letter (j).  
Whichever one of these that you find, you put 
an “X” or check mark there and then, put it on 
the front.  Don’t spell it out, the whole thing, 
just what letter you might have found.   
 
The trial judge reiterated this instruction for the “second 
block” under section (2) and then instructed the jury as to 
mitigating circumstances:   
 
And then, you would as I said before, on the 
second page indicate which [aggravating 
circumstances] they were and put it on the front 
here, like a small number or (a) or (b) or (c) or 
whatever one you might find.  And then, 
underneath that, there are:  “The mitigating 
circumstances(s) [sic] is/are __.”  And those 
mitigating circumstances appear on the third 
page here.  They run from a little (a) to a little 
letter (h).  And whichever ones you find there, 
you will put an “X” mark or check mark and 
then, put it on the front here at the bottom, 
which says mitigating circumstances. 
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the trial judge distinguished between mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances with respect to the proper standard 
of proof applicable to each.9  This reinforced the apparent 
similitude with respect to the finding of mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances, increasing the “risk that the jury 
was misinformed,” id. at 381, and impermissibly limited in its 
consideration of mitigating evidence.  Accordingly, unlike the 
jury in Spisak, the jury here was required to specify not only 
the aggravating circumstances it found but also mitigating 
circumstances, to do so simultaneously, to choose aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances from visually identical lists, and 
to represent its findings as to each in an identical manner.  In 
light of what the form and instructions both said and implied, 
and the repeated emphasis on unanimous findings, it is 
notable that neither the verdict form nor the judge’s charge 
indicated in any manner that the jury should apply the 
                                                 
9 The jury instructions stated: 
 
The [C]ommonwealth has the burden of proving 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The defendant has the burden of proving 
mitigating circumstances, but only by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  This is a lesser 
burden of proof than beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  A preponderance of the evidence exists 
where one side is more believable than the other 
side.  All the evidence from both sides, 
including the evidence you heard earlier during 
the trial-in-chief as to aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances is important and proper for you 
to consider. 
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unanimity requirement to its finding of aggravating but not 
mitigating circumstances. 
 Accordingly, we conclude our judgment that there is a 
“substantial probability” the jury believed it could not 
consider any mitigating circumstance not unanimously agreed 
upon is consistent with Spisak.  “There is, of course, no 
extrinsic evidence of what the jury in this case actually 
thought.”  Mills, 486 U.S. at 381.  But we need only conclude 
a “natural interpretation,” id., of the forms and instructions 
together clearly brought about “the circumstance that Mills 
found critical, namely,” Spisak, 130 S. Ct. at 684, “a 
substantial probability that reasonable jurors . . . well may 
have thought they were precluded from considering any 
mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the 
existence of a particular such circumstance,” Mills, 486 U.S. 
at 384. 
V. 
  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to reject 
Abu-Jamal’s mitigation instruction claim involved an 
objectively unreasonable application of Mills.  On post-
conviction review of this matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court found no Mills violation.  The Court reasoned:  
The verdict slip employed in the instant case 
consisted of three pages. The requirement of 
unanimity is found only at page one in the 
section wherein the jury is to indicate its 
sentence. The second page of the form lists all 
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the statutorily enumerated aggravating 
circumstances and includes next to each such 
circumstance a designated space for the jury to 
mark those circumstances found. The section 
where the jury is to checkmark those mitigating 
circumstances found, appears at page three and 
includes no reference to a finding of unanimity. 
Indeed, there are no printed instructions 
whatsoever on either page two or page three. 
The mere fact that immediately following that 
section of verdict slip, the jurors were required 
to each sign their name is of no moment since 
those signature lines naturally appear at the 
conclusion of the form and have no explicit 
correlation to the checklist of mitigating 
circumstances. As such, we cannot conclude, as 
Appellant urges, that the structure of the form 
could lead the jurors to believe that they must 
unanimously agree on mitigating evidence 
before such could be considered. Moreover, 
verdict slips similar to that employed in the 
instant matter have been held by our court not 
to violate the dictates of Mills. 
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 119 (Pa. 1998).   
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused exclusively 
on the verdict form and reached its conclusion without 
considering the entire jury charge.  Significantly, the court did 
not evaluate or address the trial judge’s oral instructions.  See 
id.  As a consequence, the court did not consider whether the 
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language “a verdict must be a sentence of death . . . if the jury 
unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances 
which outweigh any mitigating circumstances,” would create 
a substantial probability the jury had understood the 
instructions to preclude consideration of mitigating 
circumstances that were not agreed to by all twelve members 
of the jury.  Nor did the court consider the effect on the jury 
of being instructed identically and contemporaneously with 
respect to the making of individual determinations regarding 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.  Moreover, 
although the court rejected the claim that the “structure of the 
form could lead the jurors to believe that they must 
unanimously agree on mitigating evidence before such could 
be considered,” id., it conducted an incomplete analysis of 
only a portion of the verdict form, rather than the entire form.  
The court did not consider whether the language “[w]e, the 
jury, have found unanimously . . . one or more aggravating 
circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
circumstances,” would create a substantial probability the 
jury had applied the form in violation of Mills, nor did the 
court address the likely effect on the jury of having to choose 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances from visually 
identical lists and represent its findings as to each in an 
identical manner.  Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court failed to evaluate whether the complete text of the 
verdict form, together with the jury instructions, would create 
a substantial probability the jury believed both aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances must be found unanimously.  
See id.  For these reasons, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
application of Mills was objectively unreasonable. 
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VI. 
 Like the Mills Court, “[a]lthough we are hesitant to 
infer too much about the . . . verdict form from . . . well-
meant efforts to remove ambiguity from the State’s capital 
sentencing scheme, we cannot avoid noticing . . . significant 
changes effected in instructions to the jury.”  486 U.S. at 382.  
On February 1, 1989, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
adopted a uniform sentencing verdict form for capital cases.  
See Pa. R. Crim P. 358A (effective July 1, 1989).  The new 
form, promulgated shortly after Mills was decided on June 6, 
1988, “reflects the requirement that jurors not be prevented 
from considering all evidence in mitigation,” Mills, 486 U.S. 
at 382, and makes explicit that unanimity is not required in 
determining the existence of mitigating circumstances.  The 
relevant portion of the revised form reads: 
II. SENTENCING VERDICT AND FINDINGS 
If  you have reached a unanimous verdict, complete this 
part of the form. 
In Section A, indicate whether the sentencing 
verdict is death or life imprisonment. If the 
sentence is death, indicate the basis for that 
verdict by completing Section B. If the sentence 
is life imprisonment, indicate the basis for that 
verdict by completing Section C. 
A. We, the jury, unanimously sentence the 
defendant to (check one): 
______ Death 
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______ Life Imprisonment 
B. The findings on which the sentence of death 
is based are (check one): 
______1. At least one aggravating circumstance 
and no mitigating circumstance. 
The aggravating circumstance(s) unanimously 
found (is) (are): 
______. 
______2. One or more aggravating 
circumstances which outweigh(s) any 
mitigating circumstance(s). 
The aggravating circumstance(s) unanimously 
found (is) (are): 
______. 
The mitigating circumstance(s) found by one or 
more of us (is) (are): 
______. 
C. The findings on which the sentence of life 
imprisonment is based are (check one): 
______1. No aggravating circumstance exists. 
______2. The mitigating circumstance(s) (is) 
(are) not outweighed by the aggravating 
circumstance(s). 
The mitigating circumstance(s) found by one or 
more of us (is) (are): 
______. 
The aggravating circumstance(s) unanimously 
found (is) (are): 
______. 
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Pa. R. Crim P. 358A (emphasis added).  The form used in 
Abu-Jamal’s trial simply read “[w]e, the jury, have found 
unanimously . . . one or more aggravating circumstances 
which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.  The 
aggravating circumstance(s) is/are __.  The mitigating 
circumstance(s) is/are __.”  By contrast, the revised uniform 
verdict slip states “[t]he mitigating circumstance(s) found by 
one or more of us (is) (are),” thereby making clear that, 
although aggravating circumstances must be found 
unanimously, mitigating evidence need not be found 
unanimously in order to be considered by individual jurors 
during the weighing and balancing process.  The 
Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions 
were also amended to remove ambiguity with respect to the 
consideration of mitigating evidence during the weighing and 
balancing process.  See Pennsylvania Suggested Standard 
Criminal Jury Instructions §15.2502H(3) (2006).  The new 
instruction reads, in relevant part: 
When voting on the general findings, you are to 
regard a particular aggravating circumstance as 
present only if you all agree that it is present.  
On the other hand, each of you is free to regard 
a particular mitigating circumstance as present 
despite what other jurors may believe.  This is 
different from the general findings to reach your 
ultimate sentence of either life in prison or 
death.  The specific findings as to any particular 
aggravating circumstance must be unanimous.  
All of you must agree that the Commonwealth 
has proven it beyond a reasonable doubt.  That 
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is not true for any mitigating circumstance.  
Any circumstance that any juror considers to be 
mitigating may be considered by that juror in 
determining the proper sentence.  This different 
treatment of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances is one of the law’s safeguards 
against unjust death sentences.  It gives a 
defendant the full benefit of any mitigating 
circumstances.  It is closely related to the 
burden of proof requirements.  Remember, the 
Commonwealth must prove any aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt while 
the defendant only has to prove any mitigating 
circumstance by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Your final sentence—life 
imprisonment or death—must be unanimous.  
All of you must agree that the sentence should 
be life imprisonment or that the sentence should 
be death because there is at least one 
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
circumstance or because the aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstance or circumstances found 
by any juror. 
Id.  These clarifications highlight the ambiguity at issue in 
this case and on their own serve at least to suggest the 
substantial probability that “some jurors were prevented from 
considering ‘factors which may call for a less severe 
penalty.’”  Mills, 486 U.S. at 376 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).  Accordingly, “[w]e can and do 
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infer from these changes at least some concern . . . that juries 
could misunderstand the previous instructions as to unanimity 
and the consideration of mitigating evidence by individual 
jurors.”  Id. at 382. 
VII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of relief on the mitigation instruction claim.  As 
the District Court noted, the “Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania may conduct a new sentencing hearing in a 
manner consistent with this opinion within 180 days of the 
Order accompanying this [opinion], during which period the 
execution of the writ of habeas corpus will be stayed, or shall 
sentence [Abu-Jamal] to life imprisonment.”  Abu-Jamal, 
2001 WL 1609690, at *130. 
